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A prospective surveillance program for influenza
viruses was established in Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (PDR) in July of 2005. We report isolation of
H5N1 virus genetically distinct from H5N1 circulating in
2004, which indicates reintroduction of H5N1 into Lao PDR
after its disappearance (i.e., no virologic or serologic evi-
dence) for 2 years.
H
5N1 influenza viruses have continuously circulated in
southeastern Asia since 1996 (1–5). During late 2003
and early 2004, highly pathogenic H5N1 spread through-
out China, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Lao
People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) with a high lethality
for domestic poultry; whereas in Vietnam, Thailand, and
Cambodia, humans were infected but at a lower rate.
In Lao PDR, outbreaks were reported in the provinces
of Vientiane Capital, Champasak, and Savannakhét.
Approximately 155,000 poultry either died of disease or
were culled, which contained the 2003–2004 outbreak. No
human cases have been reported, and no scientific evi-
dence has indicated avian influenza cases in poultry in Lao
PDR since March 2004. This finding raises some ques-
tions. Had H5N1 viruses been eradicated from Lao PDR,
or had they survived in domestic waterfowl to which they
were nonpathogenic, as Chen et al. described in southern
China (6,7)?
In response to outbreaks of H5N1, prospective surveil-
lance programs have been established in affected south-
eastern Asian countries. In southern China, systematic
surveillance of poultry markets has been ongoing since
July 2000 (7). Thailand launched a comprehensive nation-
wide surveillance strategy (the x-ray survey) in October
2004 (8). Cambodia and Vietnam have also initiated sur-
veillance programs, but little is known about the extent of
the programs and their results. In Lao PDR since the out-
break in early 2004, surveillance programs have been lim-
ited to confirming the presence or absence of avian
influenza. Given the frequency of H5N1 outbreaks in the
region, a baseline for surveillance and determination of
risk areas was essential. Therefore, in July 2005 we helped
the Lao National Animal Health Centre establish a
prospective surveillance program. We report the results of
an 8-month surveillance program and the apparent reintro-
duction of H5N1 viruses into Lao PDR in early 2006.
The Study
Extensive virologic surveillance began in Lao PDR in
July 2005. During 8 months, 8,592 samples were collected
from healthy ducks, chickens, quail, and pigs at live mar-
kets in Vientiane, Champasak, and Savannakhét provinces,
near the borders of Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia
(Figure 1). Cloacal swabs were stored in 1.0 mL of virus
isolation media. The samples were injected into chicken or
duck eggs, and allantoic fluid was harvested after 72 h and
analyzed as described (9). As of January 2006, no evidence
of any influenza virus subtypes had been detected in any
species.
In January 2006, serologic surveillance was initiated to
clarify whether poultry in Lao PDR had been exposed to
influenza viruses and recovered. Vaccination of poultry is
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Figure 1. Map of Lao People’s Democratic Republic indicates
regions (black areas) of influenza virus surveillance. Outbreaks of
H5N1 occurred in Vientiane (location of isolation of
A/Duck/Laos/3295/2006) (A), Savannakhét (B), and Champasak
(C) provinces during late 2003 and early 2004. not practiced in Lao PDR, which made serologic surveil-
lance possible. Serologic analysis for antibodies to influen-
za viruses was performed with ELISA and
hemagglutination inhibition (HI). The IDEXX FlockChek
AIV (IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., Westbrook, ME, USA)
was used to initially screen for antibodies to influenza.
Sera were then tested by HI with antigens to H5, H6, H7,
and H9 influenza subtypes as described (10). Initial results
from serologic surveillance confirmed virus isolation
results and absence of vaccine use; however, in early
February 2006, in apparently healthy ducks in a live mar-
ket in Vientiane, we detected antibodies to the viral hemag-
glutinins H5 (HI titers 40 to <640) and H9 (HI titer 80).
Only 21 (3.5%) of 604 birds had positive test results at that
time; 1 duck had antibodies to H5 and H9.
In late February 2006, H5N1 was isolated from healthy
ducks at a layer farm in Vientiane Capital. The source of
the isolated H5N1 is unknown, but our 8-month prospec-
tive surveillance program showed that it was recently
introduced into this infected flock. Cloacal samples from
40 ducks at a duck farm in Vientiane tested negative for
H5N1 virus in November 2005, but upon retesting in late
February 2006, results for the same flock were positive for
H5N1. To identify the source of the new isolate, we com-
pared the sequence of its hemagglutinin gene with those of
H5N1 viruses isolated since 2003 in China, Thailand,
Vietnam, and Cambodia (Figure 2).
Sequence analysis indicated that the new H5N1 isolate
(A/duck/Laos/3295/2006) (GenBank accession no.
DQ845348) was not closely related to the other viruses cir-
culating in Southeast Asia during 2003 and 2004. It clus-
tered phylogenetically with H5N1 viruses isolated in
China in 2005 and was most closely related to a 2005
human isolate from Anhui, China (A/Anhui/1/2005) (11).
Furthermore, the 2004 Laotian H5N1 virus strains clus-
tered with 2004 isolates from Malaysia, Thailand, and
Vietnam. This evidence suggests that the H5N1 virus had
recently been introduced into Lao PDR; however, its direct
source is unknown. Despite its origin in China, it clustered
with a 2005 Vietnamese virus isolate (A/duck/
Vietnam/568/2005) and therefore may have crossed into
Lao PDR from Vietnam. A Malaysian H5N1 isolate (A/
chicken/Malaysia/935/2006) also clustered with this group
rather than with Malaysian isolates from 2004, which indi-
cates that it was likely a new introduction into Malaysia.
Surveillance for H5N1 continued in the area surround-
ing the infected farm. Two months after the isolation of
H5N1, 40 cloacal swabs and 28 serum samples were col-
lected from ducks at the infected and surrounding farms.
All cloacal swabs had negative results for influenza virus-
es, and serum samples had negative results for antibodies
to H5N1. As of June 2006, no reports of infected poultry
have been made since the isolation, which indicates that
H5N1 did not spread and its introduction may have been
an isolated event; however, surveillance is ongoing.
Conclusions
As highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses continue
to spread into Eurasia, whether they will become endemic
in Eurasian poultry or whether the highly pathogenic
H5N1 will burn out and disappear with the possibility of
reintroduction is unknown. We describe results from the
first active surveillance study in Lao PDR since the 2004
outbreak. We extensively sampled live markets and local
farms in Vientiane Capital and additionally sampled dis-
tricts bordering Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam.
A genetically distinct H5N1 was isolated from apparently
healthy ducks, which indicates reintroduction of H5N1 in
Lao PDR. Serologic data, antibodies to H5 in serum sam-
ples from apparently healthy ducks found in live markets,
provide additional evidence of H5N1 in Lao PDR;
however, we cannot rule out the illegal use of vaccines.
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic relationship of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene
of representative H5N1 influenza virus strains isolated in
Southeast Asia from 2003 through 2006. Analysis was based on
nucleotides 1–1012 (1,012 bp) of the HA gene. Viruses isolated in
Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 2004 and 2006 are under-
lined. The strain isolated from ducks in Vientiane in February 2006
is shaded.Evidence of an H9 subtype was also detected in a duck that
was seropositive for H9 antibodies; however, no H9
influenza subtypes were isolated.
Whether H5N1 influenza viruses are endemic in wild
migratory birds is unresolved; however, our study supports
the notion that highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses are not
endemic in Lao PDR. Our findings suggest that the H5N1
virus did not become established after the 2004 outbreak in
Lao PDR, which is less densely populated than neighbor-
ing Thailand, Vietnam, and China (high summer tempera-
tures in Lao PDR may have also been a factor). Instead, the
virus disappeared and was later replaced by a newly intro-
duced virus. Although no measures were taken to eradicate
the virus, the newly introduced H5N1 has since vanished
from the area. The area has been identified as high risk and
has become the focus of ongoing surveillance.
This virus appears to have disappeared on its own in
Lao PDR in the absence of vaccines and with limited sur-
veillance, unlike what happened in the more densely pop-
ulated Thailand, Vietnam, and China. In China, H5N1
continues to circulate in poultry despite ongoing surveil-
lance and use of vaccines; heroic measures were required
to eradicate H5N1 in Thailand, and since the use of vac-
cines in Vietnam in 2005, no more human cases have been
reported.
These findings are encouraging for the less densely
populated, developing countries of Africa and Asia
because they suggest that H5N1 viruses are not being per-
petuated through wild migratory birds. To date, wild birds
have not been found to carry and spread highly pathogen-
ic H5 and H7 influenza viruses; instead, each outbreak has
been caused by a phylogenetically new virus, whose par-
ent viruses were not pathogenic (12,13).
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